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BOOK REVIEWS
tional liberty in a manner that convinced them that they were the
oppressed, not the oppressors, the victims, not the tyrants." Repub-
lican efforts to establish democratic constitutional governments
were seen as real threats to constitutional liberty. Ultimately, not
only were the redeemers successful throughout the south, but
Benedict also reminds us that "by the 1870s and 1880s their ideas
'were no longer just southern.'"
One of the most significant essays in the collection is Benedict's
well-researched critique of C. Van Woodward's thesis concerning
the "compromise" so important to the disputed presidential elec-
tion of 1876. Through roll call analysis as well as more traditional
historical research, Benedict has pretty well demolished Wood-
ward's claim that there was a well-planned and accepted implemen-
tation of a compromise where, in return for certain actions to be
undertaken later by Hayes, Democratic members of congress would
permit key votes on the move to accept the pro-Hayes findings of
the Electoral Commission-without which he could not gain the
presidency. Conceding that there was indeed a semi-secret confer-
ence between Hayes's representatives and southern politicians, and
that negotiations did in fact occur, Benedict essentially argues that
they were irrelevant in that the key decisions had already been
reached before the meetings ever took place.
Taken together, these essays offer perceptive and sometimes
provocative insights into Reconstruction and the Gilded Age. As is
inevitable in such a collection, some repetition does occur, but
Benedict skillfully integrates contemporary constitutional history
with political developments. How persuasive is his claim that devo-
tion to traditional constitutional values was as significant-if not
more so-than simple racism in the demise of Reconstruction? In
considering such a question one might note that racism can easily
be disguised as a love of constitutional standards. His essays invite
reflection on this sad but ineluctable truth concerning our legal
history. Production flaw aside, they deserve careful reading.
JONATHAN LURIE
Rutgers University
GEORGE ATHAN BILLIAS. American Constitutionalism Heard Round
the World, 1776-1989: A Global Perspective. New York: New
York University Press, 2009. 544 pp. $60.00 (cloth).
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That a lot has been written in America about the various Euro-
pean sources of inspiration for the framers of our Constitution is a
truism repeated here only for contrast. This book is an attempt, on
the other hand, to fill what its author correctly regarded as a con-
spicuous gap in the literature published in the United States about
the influence of American constitutionalism abroad. "No single
historical narrative synthesizes the worldwide influence of American
constitutionalism [during the time from the American Revolution
to the collapse of the Soviet empire]" (p. 373). By and large, the au-
thor's attempt succeeds admirably.
Geoge Athan Billias, the Jacob and Frances Hiatt Professor of
History Emeritus at Clark University, argues that American consti-
tutionalism has made the world a better place by facilitating atten-
tion elsewhere to fundamental human rights and the legal tools
for their protection from State abuse. It is a heroic effort on behalf
of the national winner of the bronze medal for influential consti-
tutionalism. Early, Billias admits that, among the three brands of
Western constitutionalism, the American has had less influence on
developments elsewhere than that of either England or France. In
his view, this is primarily a function of familiarity, the result of
empire, and there is no good reason to question this judgment.
Eventually, Billias gets around to positioning the sort of consti-
tutionalism labeled "Marxism Leninism" as competition for the
Western sort, a juxtaposition justifiable more in the dimension of
ideology than in those of geography and history. In what cardinal
quadrant other than the West could Marxism Leninism be posi-
tioned? Billias mentions only in passing another, alternative consti-
tutionalism, the "East Asia model," delving no deeper in that
direction than to point out that it affords priority to a free-market
economy over democratic constitutionalism, and thereby exposing
his work at least to criticism that he has unjustifiably discounted a
distinct constitutionalism sounding in Confucianism and Buddhism.
This is certainly a comprehensive study, admittedly-and justi-
fiably-the work of twenty years. It makes reference to perhaps
more than a hundred constitutions, as well as to numerous consti-
tutional miscarriages. Its reach embraces states and nations large
and small, the extant and the nearly forgotten.
What the author sets out to do is to trace the influence of Amer-
ican constitutionalism on constitution makers active from 1776
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through 1989 around the world. He treats as originally or distinc-
tively American the concepts of popular sovereignty, textual embodi-
ment, constituent assembly, popular ratification, bicameralism,
presidentialism, judicial review, federalism, amendment protocol,
and a bill of rights. He identifies as the media for propagation of
these concepts six American texts: the Declaration of Independ-
ence, the set collectively of the first state constitutions to follow
independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Federalist Papers,
the Constitution of 1789, and the Bill of Rights. He then demarcates
seven "Echoes," or eras of constitutional creativity elsewhere in
which he finds more or less American influence. Thus, the work is
blessed with more than adequate structure in the form of three
axes: element, text, and time. This makes for surprisingly easy naviga-
tion of an opus of 376 text pages supported by notes comprising
another 112 pages.
In his survey, Billias opts for a set of six American legal media,
but a seventh might well have been the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,
to which ought to be ascribed not only the American process for ad-
mission of new states to the Union, but also confirmation in written
law of certain fundamental rights including religious freedom, trial
by jury, bail, compensation for property taken by government for a
public purpose, and protection from cruel or unusual punishment.
It also included America's first national proscription of slavery and
involuntary servitude. An eighth medium of the same sort might
have been another set comprised at least of the Mayflower
Covenant of 1620 and the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut
(1628) were Professor Billias to accept that another original or dis-
tinctive American concept is constitutional coordination of secular
and religious sovereignties. But decisions of this sort are naturally
subjective and the set of six texts on which Billias has settled ought
to attract little objection for over-inclusiveness.
The elevation from which Billias makes his reconnaissance and
the breadth of his study more than excuse the occasional gaffe. Justi-
fying his choice of the Declaration of Independence for the set of
American constitutional media, he writes (p. 16), "According to the
current school of legal realists-legal historians, law professors, and
lawyers-a constitutional text must be based on a positivist view of
the law, establish a government grounded on its principles, contain
all necessary institutions, and include a proper codification of
2011
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
laws." In the accompanying note, John Phillip Read and Benno
Schmidt are named as legal realists of this ilk, apparently because
they both concluded that the Declaration of Independence is not a
constitution. Billias leaves it for his readers to make a connection
between their espousal of legal realism and their common conclu-
sion about the Declaration, which seems more positivist than realist
on its face. My best guess is that Billias assumes only devotees of
the Natural Law can agree with him.
By way of overture, Billias offers in Part I an extended definition
of American constitutionalism which leads naturally to a conclusion
that for him the American constitutional creed is complete by 1789.
Equal protection, a concept unmentioned in either the original text
of our Constitution or its Bill of Rights, a limit on national power that
is purely judicial in origin, eventually emerges in this work as another
distinctively American feature, but Billias speaks of it only as a child
of the Declaration. Indeed, even his respect for the Bill of Rights is
uneven. From his silence, it might be inferred that the Second and
Third Amendments are not even parts of American constitutional-
ism, much less distinctive parts. Perhaps the general disinterest
elsewhere in their reproduction justifies giving them such short
shrift, but, for his pet concepts, Billias reports even occasions on
which their only influence was to move foreign framers in the
opposite direction. He is also conspicuously silent about the Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Amendments, even though he clearly regards
federalism as a distinctly American constitutional concept.
Otherwise, in Part I Billias provides a generally sound sketch of
American constitutional law, misspeaking only rarely, as when he
says that offices are restricted by the U.S. Constitution to those who
own property. Occasionally, his conclusions outstrip their bases, as
when he declares that the Articles of Confederation suggested that
the national court system was authorized by Article III of its succes-
sor and anticipated the Judiciary Act of 1789. This might seem a
stretch from a text in which the only courts authorized are those
"for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas
and ... for receiving and determining finally appeals in all cases of
captures," but a very plausible case has been made recently by
Steven Snell in Courts of Admiralty and the Common Law (2007)
that the decision to equip federal courts with diversity jurisdiction
followed from a prosaic concern by the Framers about how federal
admiralty courts might otherwise be enabled to earn their keep.
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Having defined his terms, Billias turns in Part II to a report of
constitution-drafting events worldwide for which there is evidence
of influence by his American texts. In the next nine chapters, Billias
visits eras of his own contrivance, ranging in duration from the short
remainder of the 18th century after 1789 in Europe to almost the
entire 19th century in South America. Sometimes, his evidence of
American influence on foreign constitution drafting is direct, when
records survive of the discussions among drafters. Sometimes, the
evidence is more circumstantial, when drafters or those influencing
drafters previously published commentary on American constitu-
tional texts. Sometimes, the evidence is remote, for example when
an American influence is found in some provision for judicial review
in a single-purpose court of the sort preferred by Kelsen rather than
a supreme judicial court exercising supervisory power meanwhile.
Among the foreign constitutionalists commenting on the U.S.
Constitution at the end of the 18th century is Condorcet, who accord-
ing to Billias fretted in his Projet de constitution that the power
to suspend the writ of habeas corpus might be assigned to judges
because of the risk they would abuse that power. A little more about
this from Billias would have been appreciated. It might be imagined,
for example, that Condorcet feared pusillanimous judges choosing
to suspend the Great Writ rather than to confront the government
jailer, but where else might a suspending power be placed with less
risk to everyone's freedom than in the hands of a judiciary with the
independence of life tenure?
When he writes in Chapter 4 about the influence of American
constitutionalism in South America during the 19th century, he nat-
urally focuses on the Great Liberator, and uses relations between
the United States and Bolivar to explain why American concepts
gained relatively little traction. He obviously regards as important
an incident in which Bolivar and the United States clashed over the
seizure of two merchant ships, but his account of that incident
is muddled and simplistic. E. Taylor Parks wrote of the incident
in Colombia and the United States 1765-1934 (1935). According
to Parks' well-documented version, the ships were American, cap-
tured by Bolivar's navy, over objections that they were entitled to
the protection of neutrality. Rather than afford their owners the
hearing to which international law entitled them, Bolivar's govern-
ment summarily condemned both ships and offered them for sale
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at auction. Viewed in light of continuing breaches of U.S. neutrality
by Bolivar's representatives visiting the U.S. and U.S. reluctance to
risk a general war with European powers by commencing a war with
Spain, the fact that the U.S. did not hasten to formally recognize
Bolivar's new republic seems justified. Of course, the real point
Billias intended is that Bolivar's pique with the United States stood
in the way of significant influence from that direction on his consti-
tution-making.
If his details about constitution-making in Gran Colombia are
tangled, at least one generality about the revolutions of South
America is also debatable. Billias strikes a contrast between the
revolution of Mid-Atlantic colonies against England with the revo-
lutions of South American colonies against Spain on the grounds
that, from the perspective of changes in the social order, the former
was a radical movement while the latter was a conservative move-
ment by those intent on upholding traditional values and social
goals. It is at least as true to say to the contrary that the Creole
communities in both regions reacted violently to imperial change
in the form of intensified supervision. Thus the cases are as plausibly
adjudged alike as different.
In Chapter 6, Billias writes about American influence in the form
of advice by Tocqueville to the French constituent assembly of 1848.
Tocqueville unsuccessfully urged bicameralism for France for the
same reasons that persuaded its American adoption in 1789. But
bicameralism was rarely copied elsewhere, especially after propor-
tional voting became fashionable notwithstanding the spectacular
failure of the Weimar Constitution in which it was introduced. Billias
acknowledges the conventional wisdom that the two concepts are
widely deemed incompatible, overlooking, as others have, the use-
ful service bicameralism offers where proportional voting is with
reference to national party lists. Such a system's centripetal concen-
tration of power in the seat of government, ordinarily the metrop-
olis, tends to shortchange the hinterland. With bicameralism, a
second chamber to which election comes from regional districts can
offer a centrifugal counterweight short of federalism.
According to Billias, Laboulaye in 1849 attributed the difference
in longevity between the U.S. Constitution and the nine French con-
stitutions of the same period to national attributes: the French were
by nature too theoretical and expected too much from their laws,
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whereas the Americans were more practical, relied more on expe-
rience, and were consistently pragmatic. Another commonplace
answer to which Billias pays no attention is that ours has become
the world's oldest serving constitution because we are ready to
interpret it so imaginatively, if not to honor it in the breach. But
Billias writes here of the influence of texts, not of the devices by which
they are manipulated.
Overall, his presentation of constitutional developments in
most of Europe and in Central and South America is admirably
detailed. Billias also covers, adequately under the circumstances,
developments in post-colonial Africa and Asia. Respecting the
Balkans, however, Billias covers Greece, but overlooks other states
after their liberation on the fall of the Ottoman and Austrian empires.
He misses four Albanian constitutional moments, most conspicu-
ously those that resulted in the Statute of Lushnja (1914) and its
successor, the Constitution of 1925; several constitutions of Serbia
(when it was a principality and later a monarchy), and the Tarnovo
constitution of the Kingdom of Bulgaria.
In the chapter he entitles "American Crescendo," Billias surveys
constitution drafting in the two decades following World War II. His
large theme is a Manichaean struggle between the liberal consti-
tutionalisms of the West on the one hand and Marxism Leninism on
the other. He also attributes the preference for presidential gov-
ernment in the Baltic states to the notion that it serves better the
needs of a state threatened at its borders, but without discussing
the obvious example to the contrary, the state of Israel, elsewhere
dismissed as a "special case." Having acknowledged the incom-
patibility of judicial review with parliamentary supremacy, Billias
describes (p. 289) the Japanese supreme court as "not very willing
to find laws of the Diet unconstitutional. During the first twenty
years after the 1946 Constitution went into effect, only two statutes
were declared unconstitutional." Students of judicial review in
America know that, during the first twenty years after our consti-
tution went into effect, only one act of Congress was struck down
by the Supreme Court of the United States, and the same thing did
not reoccur for another fifty-four years. Granted, in our federal
system, where states continued to enjoy general legislative powers,
judicial review far more frequently resulted in nullification of state
laws. Students of judicial review in America will also look with at his
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special indictment of the Irish Supreme Court (namely, that it turned
out to be less than daring in its review of executive decisions in aid
of national security, especially in cases of terrorist activities).
Whatever ought to be the standard to which a university press
should be held in this post-modern age of publishing, the NYU Press
surely could have done better by Billias, as could those who reviewed
his manuscript before its publication. Some error, trivial but suffi-
ciently amiss to distract, confronts a reader every ten pages or so.
Among examples of the incognizable are such sentences (pp. 177
and 233) as, "Liberalism in the nineteenth century placed a high
value on individual liberty, and parliamentary government some-
times offered constitutional monarchy as the best way of attaining
it'" and "The attorney general informed the Supreme Court that this
ruling was necessary because another situation similar to this might
set a precedent for other possessions." On the other hand
(p. 315), that the United States Central Intelligence Agency was
"established originally to operate within the United States" is clear
enough, but wrong.
Notwithstanding its peccadilloes, few enough for a project of
this magnitude, American Constitutionalism Heard Round the
World, 1776-1989 deserves respect and applause. Not only because
of the omnibus nature of the undertaking, but also because of its
structural integrity and clear prose, it succeeds in filling a gap deserv-
ing of scholarly attention. As the work of one man, it is extraordinary
in this day and age and unlikely to be equaled.
JOHN PAUL JONES
University of Richmond
THOMAS H. COX. Gibbons v. Ogden, Law, and Society in the Early
Republic. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2009. 264 pp. $44.95
(cloth); $26.95 (paper).
In 1824, in Gibbons v. Ogden, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
unconstitutional New York's steamboat monopoly, opening New
York harbor to competition from other steamboat operators and
ensuring that the nation's waterways would not be bottled up by
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